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ABSTRACT
Maintaining contamination certification of multi-mission flight hardware is an innovative
approach to controlling mission costs. Methods for assessing ground induced degradation
between missions have been employed by the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Project for the
multi-mission (servicing) hardware. By maintaining the cleanliness of the hardware between
missions, and by controlling the materials added to the hardware during modification and
refurbishment both project funding for contamination recertification and schedule have been
significantly reduced. These methods will be discussed and HST hardware data will be
presented.
INTRODUCTION
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was designed to be periodically serviced on-orbit during
its 15 year mission. The Space Transportation System (STS) serves as the platform from which
the HST is serviced and servicing carriers provide an interface from the Orbiter to the scientific
instruments and orbital replacement units. While the servicing carriers are configured for each
mission to accommodate mission unique orbital replacement units, the basic carrier (structure
and support airborne flight equipment) remains unchanged. The HST servicing carriers were
flown during the HST Servicing Mission 1 (SMI), STS-61 (December 1993) and the HST SM2,
STS-82 (February 1997). Currently, the servicing carriers are being reconfigured for the HST
SM3 (May 2000).
Due to the extreme sensitivity of the HST, scientific instrument, orbital replacement unit
optics to molecular and particulate contamination, all aspects of a servicing mission are assessed
for subsequent contamination effects to these optical elements. The assessment begins with the
basic requirements for the telescope and extends to each mission component. Because of the
large surface area of the servicing carders, both outgassing levels and surface cleanliness levels
are controlled during all aspects of integration, test, launch activities, and on-orbit operations.
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By maintaining the cleanliness of the hardware between missions, and by controlling the
materials added to the hardware during modification and refurbishment both project funding for
contamination recertification and schedule have been significantly reduced. These methods will
be discussed and HST hardware data will be presented.
SERVICING CARRIER DESCRIPTION
The HST servicing carriers include: the Solar Array Carrier (SAC), the Orbital Replacement
Unit Carrier (ORUC), the Flight Support System (FSS), the Rigid Array Carrier (RAC), the
Second Axial Carrier (SAC), and the Multi-Use Lightweight Experiment (MULE). The carriers
are shown in Figures 1-6 and the servicing mission manifest is illustrated in Table 1. The 15'
long x 15' wide x 15' high Solar Array Carrier functioned as a load isolation system for the Solar
Array 2 during the First Servicing Mission. For the Second Servicing Mission, the Solar Array
Carrier was reconfigured, renamed the Second Axial Carrier, and provided a load isolation
system for the Axial Scientific Instrument Protective Enclosure which in turn provided a
contamination and thermally controlled environment for the Near Infrared Cosmic Origins
Spectrograph (NICMOS).
Table 1. Carrier Mission Manifest
Carrier
Flight Support System
Multi-Use Lightweight Explorer
Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier
Rigid Array Carrier
Second Axial Carrier
Solar Array Carrier
Unidentified Carrier(s)
SM1
¢,
¢,
SM2
¢,
¢,
SM3
¢,
¢,
¢,
¢,
¢,
¢-
SM4
¢,
¢,
¢,
For the Third Servicing Mission, the Rigid Array Carrier, Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier,
Flight Support System, and Multi-Use Lightweight Explorer have been manifested and are
shown in the flight configuration in Figure 7. The Rigid Array Carrier and Orbital Replacement
Unit Carrier are Spacehab pallets that have been modified to provide scientific instrument and
orbital replacement unit stowage for the servicing mission. The 12' long x 15' wide x 15' high
Rigid Array carrier functions as a load isolations system for the Solar Array 3 and will be used to
stow the replaced Solar Array 2 during two extravehicular activity (EVA) days. The most
contamination sensitive carrier is the 12' long x 15' wide x 15' high ORUC. The Orbital
ReplacementUnit Carrier providesa load isolation systemfor an Axial Scientific Instrument
ProtectiveEnclosure(SIPE) and the Fine GuidanceSensorSIPE. TheseSIPEs, collectively
known as the BISIPE, provide a contaminationand thermally controlled environmentfor a
stowedscientificinstrumentandFineGuidanceSensor.Becauseof the opticalsensitivityof the
NICMOS, scientific instruments,andFineGuidanceSensors,the SecondAxial Carrierand the
OrbitalReplacementUnit Carrierarethe most contaminationsensitivecarriers. The 5' long x
15' widex 15' high Flight SupportSystemis usedasthemaintenanceplatform to berththeHST
to the Orbiter during the EVAs. The 5' long x 15' wide x 15' high Multi-Use Lightweight
Explorer provides stowagefor orbital replacementunits and is shown with the Att Shroud
CoolingSystemradiatorsmounted.
The SIPEsprovide a thermal environment equivalent to that inside the HST. The warm
thermal environment not only ensures that the scientific instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors
will remain within their temperature limits during the EVA. This also ensures that any
outgassing inside the SIPEs, which would otherwise affect the optical performance, will not
condense on the scientific instruments or Fine Guidance Sensors. The SIPEs also provide a
purge interface, which allows the scientific instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors to be purged
until launch (T-0). Vent restrictor plates (37 l.tm mesh) inhibit particulate contamination of the
scientific instruments or Fine Guidance Sensors during all ground and launch activities.
Due to the diversity of the orbital replacement units and scientific instruments manifested for
each flight, the carriers provide the most flexible stowage capability for the servicing mission
hardware. Because of this flexibility, two carriers will be flown for all planned servicing
missions- the Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier and the Flight Support System. Because of the
planned multiple missions of the Orbital Replacement Unit Carrier and Flight Support System
over a decade, the HST contamination control program looked at the "big picture" to determine
the most cost effective contamination control approach that both provides the needed
contamination controlled environment for the scientific instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors
while controlling cost. Because of the excessive cost and schedule required to recertify the
molecular outgassing levels of the individual carriers for each servicing mission, the HST
contamination control program looked at innovative methods to alleviate the recertification of
the carriers for each mission. Controlling the material added to the carriers and individually
certifying new hardware prior to integration onto the carrier accomplished this. The storage,
integration and test environment is also controlled, with the carders spending the majority of
these activities in a Class 10,000 (M 5.5) cleam-oom. When not in the cleam'oom, the carriers are
double bagged. During storage, the carriers are cleaned periodically to maintain the surface
cleanliness levels.
SERVICING MISSION CONTAMINATION PROGRAM
The servicing missions are complex and require that the telescope be exposed to the Orbiter
(including carriers) environment during the installation of the scientific instruments and Fine
Guidance Sensors into the HST Aft Shroud. This exposure is typically from one to seven hours.
During the scientific instrument installation, one EVA crewmember (i.e., an astronaut) enters the
Aft Shroud to guide both the old instrument out of the telescope and the new instrument into the
telescope. Because of this exposure and to maintain the Ultraviolet (UV) capabilities of the
telescope,the contaminationrequirementsplacedon both the Orbiter and carriers are quite
stringent. While one might argue that the scientific instrument is the most contamination
sensitive element, in reality, maintaining the low contamination flux in the telescope's optical
path is the primary contamination requirement.
Neither the Orbiter nor the extravehicular mobility unit (space suit) contamination levels can
be verified by methods other than by visual examination. Outgassing levels are not measured,
and by the nature of Orbiter, many materials generally not used around sensitive hardware are
used for performance. Where possible, materials which are verified to be high outgassing, which
would not impact the Orbiter performance have been removed for the HST servicing missions.
In addition, a best effort is made to control contamination during Orbiter processing activities.
Ground processing activities, Orbiter integration and the overall mission activities are
assessed for subsequent contamination effects to the HST and the scientific instruments and Fine
Guidance Sensors for each servicing mission. This assessment begins with the basic
requirements for the HST and extended to each mission component. An overall contamination
budget is developed which allocates acceptable degradation among mission phases. The
servicing mission cleanliness requirements and budgets are set with respect to hardware line-of-
sight views of sensitive surfaces, purging of the scientific instruments for sustaining critical
element functional lifetime, Orbiter and EVA effects, Orbiter cleanliness, cleanroom protocol,
and Kennedy Space Center integration activities.
Prior to each servicing mission, the HST contamination control philosophy is reviewed to
determine it applicability to reflown carrier hardware, new scientific instruments, new orbital
replacement units, and HST optical performance. The current contamination control program
evolved from both the SM1 and SM2 program and has been updated for SM3 based on post-
mission results (1, 2). The servicing carriers met stringent outgassing requirements prior to
SM1, and the integrity of the outgassing certification of the carriers have been maintained for
both SM2 and SM3. Only new carriers, and significantly reworked contamination sensitive
hardware, such as the SIPEs, are certified to the required outgassing rate prior to a servicing
mission.
Telescope and Scientific Instrument Requirements
To maintain the UV performance of the telescope and therefore, the scientific instruments,
the telescope contamination requirements address both the surface level cleanliness of the
Primary and Secondary mirror and the allowable outgassing flux rate for the telescope's optical
path (known as the hub area). The scientific instrument requirements are based on the optical
sensitivity of the scientific instrument.
Primary and Secondary Mirrors
The particulate contamination requirements are less than a 5 percent maximum area coverage
for the summation of the Primary and Secondary Mirrors. This was determined pre-launch by
measuring the obscuration ratio of optical witness mirrors. To date, no scientific instrument data
has indicated that this requirement has been violated.
The molecularcontaminationrequirementis lessthan a 10 percent decrease in reflectance at
Lyman-Alpha (1216 Angstrom) wavelengths on the Primary and Secondary Mirrors atter 5 years
on-orbit. This was determined pre-launch by measuring optical witness mirrors. Neither
integrated nor periodic measurements indicated that this requirement had been violated: The
initial outgassing criteria was 4.33 x 10 -13 g/cm2-s flux as measured with the mirrors at nominal
operating temperatures and the collector at -20°C. The optical witness mirror reflectance
degradation also needed to be less than 3 percent at Lyman-Alpha wavelengths.
Hub Area
The light path of the telescope is referred to as the hub area. The four axial and one radial
scientific instrument apertures, the three Fine Guidance Sensor apertures and the back of the
primary mirror define this area. To control the amount of contamination entering this area and to
prevent cross contamination, contamination requirements are flowed down to the scientific
instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors. The outgassing rate from an instrument aperture or a
Fine Guidance Sensor aperture into the hub area cannot exceed 1.32 x 10 .9 g/see. The Fine
Guidance Sensor's outgassing rate is measured with the instrument at worse case hot operational
temperatures (approximately 25°C) and the collector at -65°C. Similarly, the surface level
contamination requirements for any item entering the telescope are Level 400B per MIL-STD
1246.
Aft Shroud
Four axial scientific instruments are installed in the Aft Shroud. To control the amount of
contamination entering this area and to prevent cross contamination, the scientific instruments
must meet minimum surface level cleanliness and outgassing requirements. The scientific
instrument exterior surface cleanliness level shall not exceed 400B per MIL-STD 1246. The
outgassing requirement measured at the scientific instruments at_ vent cannot exceed an
equivalent rate of 1.56 x 10 "9 g/hr-cm 2 based on the exterior surface area of the instrument. This
outgassing rate is measured with the scientific instrument ten degrees above the worse case hot
operational temperatures and the collector at -20°C. While the largest percentage of the
outgassed products is vented through the telescope's a_ vents, there is a small probability that an
instrument could increase the flux in the hub area, affecting the telescope's performance.
Scientific Instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors
The scientific instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors have individual contamination
requirements based on their optical sensitivity. For example, scientific instruments viewing in
the UV wavelength regions would have the most sensitivity to molecular contamination. While
those scientific instruments viewing in the infrared wavelength regions would have the greatest
sensitivity to particulate contamination. The scientific instruments and Fine Guidance Sensors
are delivered to NASA with verification of internal contamination levels. These levels are
maintained throughout the integration, test and launch activities through contamination controls
such as a gaseous Nitrogen purge.
Orbiter and EVA Effects
In addition to many hardware cleanliness requirements, numerous analyses were performed
for the Orbiter environment and EVA contamination impacts. These analyses provided critical
assessments for controlling on-orbit contamination generating activities and provided the
necessary quantitative details for imposing ground processing requirements for the Orbiter. The
major analyses include plume impingement, waste/water dumps, SIPE, extravehicular mobility
unit (EMU), Orbiter reboost, and HST configuration changes including deployed solar arrays.
These analyses represent the core of the cleanliness concerns associated with the shuttle and
EVAs. In addition to the analysis for the Orbiter, cleaning requirements were assessed and
levied on the Orbiter payload bay. To quantify the effects of the crew compartment on
subsequent EVAs relative to the particulate environment, two witness plates were flown on STS-
51. These results were used to determine crew cabin and EMU (space suit) cleanliness
requirements (4).
The analysis of the Orbiter plume impingement assessed the degradation of the HST surfaces
due to gaseous and liquid droplet impingement from thruster firings during maneuvers and
station keeping operations. Byproducts from the incomplete combustion, such as monomethyl
hydrazine (MMH)-nitrate, can have detrimental effects on contamination sensitive and thermal
control surfaces. The station keeping and attitude adjustments considered were low-Z and norm-
Z modes. Because the byproduct mass flux in the Norm-Z thruster firing case was significant,
limitations were imposed for Orbiter operations.
Significant droplets are formed during Orbiter waste/water exhaust. These droplets may pose
a potential threat to the HST during EVA operations when the telescope's All Shroud doors are
open. The estimation of the maximum effluent released during these dumps is approximately
320-Ibm for each dump. Since this represents a significant amount of released material during
the HST servicing operations, restrictions were set in both the First Servicing Mission and
Second Servicing Mission flight rules. All dumps were constrained 120 minutes prior to and
during EVA to preclude potential impingement on critical area of the HST.
Because the SIPEs provided cleanliness protection during launch, ascent, and on-orbit
operations for the scientific instruments, a separate analysis was performed to assess
contamination impacts. The primary objective was to examine impacts due to the particle
control redistribution within the SIPEs, molecular flow, and moisture control within the SIPEs.
All of the elements of this analysis accounted for any degradation to the scientific instruments
during these phases.
During an EVA, the amount and type of contamination emitted by the astronaut was
considered a threat to optical surfaces on the HST. In addition, the astronaut was in close
proximity (e.g., line of sight) to the scientific instruments and All Shroud. The main concern
was contamination contributions from the EMU (i.e., space suit). The EMU exhaust was
analyzed and assessed for molecular and particulate contributions. The main byproduct of the
EMU exhaust was estimated to be 1 to 1.5 lb/hr of water vapor/ice. Because the sensitive HST
surface temperatures were above the water condensation temperature for a low pressure
environment, no contaminant depositions from the EMUs were expected.
OrbiterPayloadBay CleanlinessRequirements
TheOrbiterpayloadbay liner andthermalcontrolblankets(forwardand aft bulkheads,Bays
12 and 13)provides thermalcontrol to the payloadand may be flown Onmany mission. A
reflown liner sectionor thermal control blanketsmay provide a largeoutgassingsourceto a
payloadif contaminatedby a previouspayloadonanothermission. As this potentialoutgassing
sourcecould not be quantifiedor outgassingspecifiedidentified, a new, unfiown payloadbay
liner wasrequestedfor theentirepayloadbay. Thethermalblanketscouldnotbe replaceddueto
excessivecost;however,theywerecleanedwith anisopropylalcohol(IPA)/deionized(DI) water
mixture andverified to haveno significantfluorescingmolecularcontamination.Small amounts
of molecularcontaminationcouldbe tolerated,but were evaluatedon a case-by-casebasisand
were dependenton locationwithin thepayloadbay.
Basedon the hardwarecleanlinessrequirements,for both the First and Second Servicing
Mission a new payload bay liner was cleaned to visibly clean highly sensitive (VCHS), per
Johnson Space Center Document Number SNC-0005C, with an IPA/DI water mixture. During
the Orbiter servicing in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), the payload bay liner and thermal
blankets including bilge area and wire trays were vacuumed every three days. Both the Goddard
Space Flight Center and Kennedy Space Center contamination teams were success orientated,
and as such, cleaned the payload bay to VCHS at the Pad Payload Changeout Room (PCR).
Vertical cleaning at the Pad provided both the best access to all levels, but also provided a top
down cleaning approach so that any particles cleaned from the level above, but not captured,
would fall to a level which would be subsequently cleaned. Again, the thermal blankets were
verified to have no significant fluorescing molecular contamination.
Cleanroom Protocol
The biggest contamination threat to the servicing carriers is the personnel working on or
around them. To control this threat, the servicing carriers spend the majority of their time in a
Class 10,000 (M 5.5) cleanroom. The cleanroom protocol, detailed in Reference 1, was derived
from the hardware requirements, contamination control practices, and data from previous
missions. Personnel constraints, cleanroom operating procedures, and site management issues
are addressed for each facility in which the servicing mission hardware is assembled, integrated
or tested. Activities, which have the potential to contaminate the hardware, were identified and
controlled by procedure. These activities include crew familiarizations, alignment and
envelopment measurements with the High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator and scientific
instrument to SIPE fit checks and integration.
Launch site integration activities are also a challenge to maintaining the servicing carriers
contamination levels. Because of their size, the servicing carriers must be integrated in Class
100,000 (M 6.5) facilities. However, the Class 10,000 (M 5.5) cleanroom protocols are used
which typically results in a significantly lower operating level - Class 10,000 to Class 20,000
during typical integration activities. During the scientific instrument insertion into the SIPE, the
cleanroom is run as a Class 10,000 (M 5.5) cleanroom with strict personnel limits (5). For both
the First and Second Servicing Missions, these cleanroom protocols have resulted, in hardware
contamination levels significantly below the required limit.
POST-MISSION RESULTS
The post-mission surface cleanliness results are similar for both SM1 and SM2. These levels
were measured while the carriers were in the payload bay at the Orbiter Processing Facility
within hours of the payload bay door opening. For both SM1 and SM2, the particle levels
ranged from Level 200 to Level 2000, per MIL-STD 1246. Those samples, which measured
Level 2000, typically included clothing fibers. Two swab samples were taken from each carder,
one along the centerline and one from either the starboard or port sides of the carrier depending
on personnel access. These samples measured less than 1.0 mg/m 2. As the carriers were
nominally 2.0 mg/m 2 just prior to launch and no suspicious species were identified, it was
concluded that neither the telescope nor the Orbiter had contaminated the carriers.
It should be noted that after the Second Servicing Mission, prior to the payload bay door
opening, work was performed on the Orbiter Thermal Protection System located on the payload
bay doors. When the carriers were inspected, debris was found on the carriers along the
centerline of the Orbiter. The debris was later identified through chemical analyses to be RTV
560, the adhesive used to bond the Thermal Protection System to the Orbiter. The payload bay
doors do not form a tight seal and the RTV fell into the payload bay and onto the carriers while
the Thermal Protection System work was performed. The cleanliness levels above do not
include this debris in the particle level results.
CONCLUSION
A contamination control program has been developed for multi-mission flight hardware,
which must meet stringent contamination requirements. The HST servicing carriers are integral
to the HST servicing missions, but cannot be a potential contamination source to the telescope
during EVA activities. Post-mission results from two servicing missions indicate that the
servicing carriers do not contaminate the telescope and conversely, the HST and the Orbiter do
not contaminate the servicing carriers. The main points of the HST servicing carrier
contamination control program that are applicable to any multi-mission hardware are listed
below.
.
.
.
4.
Store, integrate, and test multi-mission hardware in stringently controlled
environments, preferably a cleanroom. When not in a cleanroom, double bag
hardware with approved bagging material.
Control the type and amount of all added materials to the multi-mission hardware so
that outgassing limits are not violated. Verify, by test; that the batch of material
used will not be a significant contamination source.
Certify outgassing levels of added (new) hardware at the sub-assembly level prior
to integration onto the multi-mission hardware.
Maintain surface cleanliness levels during storage or low work periods. Periodic
cleaning is required for multi-mission hardware that is not bagged.
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Figure 7. The HST SM3 Carrier Configuration
The servicing carriers are shown integrated with the Orbiter. From the Aft (tail) forward are the
MULE, FSS, ORUC and RAC. The Orbiter external airlock is shown forward of the RAC.
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